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The Security Challenges of the “One 




The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives (“One Belt, One 
Road”) are of significance in enhancing China’s open economy. This article explores the dual security 
challenges faced by the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. These challenges include both traditional 
security challenges, such as great power competition, territorial and island disputes, and political 
turmoil in the region, as well as non-traditional threats such as terrorism, piracy, and transnational 
organized crime. This article analyzes the present situation of security cooperation in the region 
covered by “One Belt, One Road” and also suggests that China needs to pay special attention to 
three issues, namely the supply of public security goods, the interests of the United States and 
Russia, and the pivot of Pakistan, besides developing its own strength.
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Introduction
During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 
September and October of 2013, he proposed the initiative of building 
the Silk Road Economic Belt (hereafter referred to as “One Belt”) and the 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road (hereafter referred to as “One Road”), 
which links China with South-east and South Asia, Eurasia, Africa and Brazil 
through trade, investments, transport and energy infrastructure projects, 
tourism, education, culture and other areas of cooperation (Mitrovic 2016: 
76). The “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative was included as the focus 
of the year’s work in the Chinese “Government Work Report” in 2015. It 
is of great strategic significance for China to comprehensively improve 
its open economy level, and to explore deeply the current situation 
and challenges of its security cooperation, which is of great practical 
significance to ensure the realization of the strategic interests of OBOR.
The status quo of OBOR regional security 
cooperation
As early as 2012, the idea to “promote all-round improvements to China’s 
open economy” was put forward at the 18th National Congress of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC). At that congress, calls were put 
forward for coordinating bilateral, multilateral, regional and sub-regional 
cooperation, and promoting interconnection with neighboring countries. 
In 2013, the decision of the CPC Central Committee (CPCCC) on ‘Some 
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’, 
proposed that China should accelerate the construction of infrastructure 
connecting China with neighboring countries and regions, and work 
hard to build a Silk Road Economic Belt and a Maritime Silk Road, so 
as to form a new pattern of all-round economic opening. In 2015, the 
CPC Central Economic Work Conference proposed to “do a good job 
of OBOR initiative construction and implementation”. OBOR involves 
three continents including Asia, Europe and Africa. In terms of the spatial 
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scope, the “One Belt” area across the Eurasian continent can be divided 
into three parts: the core area, extension area and radiation area.1 The 
“One Road” through Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Red 
Sea and the Indian Ocean West Coast routes, can be divided into three 
sections: Southeast Asia routes, South Asia and the Persian Gulf routes, 
and Red Gulf and the Indian Ocean west coast routes.2 At present, OBOR 
regional security cooperation presents a multi-level cooperation pattern, 
including bilateral cooperation, multilateral cooperation and regional 
cooperation. The current situation of security cooperation discussed in this 
paper is limited to the various security mechanisms (organizations) formed 
by multilateral and trans-regional cooperation.
“One Belt” regional security cooperation
Core area (Central Asia) security cooperation
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), established in 2001 to 
resolve regional border disputes and create border military trust, has 
evolved over the past decade and more. The SCO now participates in the 
fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism at its core, combating 
drug smuggling, transnational organized crime and other trans-border 
criminal activity requiring security cooperation. In recent years, its 
cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, culture and other non-
traditional security areas has been continuously expanded, especially 
in the economic field, which has enhanced the overall competitiveness 
of the region through regional cooperation. In addition, the “Collective 
Security Treaty Organization” (CSTO), signed by Russia and Central Asian 
countries3 in 1992, was a security cooperation mechanism and military 
alliance in Central Asia. But with the influence of the United States in 
the 21st century extended to Central Asia, this mechanism is increasingly 
related to security-oriented cooperation.
1 The core area includes China, Russia and five Central Asian countries; the extension area includes India, Pakistan, 
Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Belarus, Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova; the radiation area includes Western Asia, the 
European Union, and can be connected to Japan, South Korea and other East Asian countries.
2 The Southeast Asia routes includes China and ASEAN as a whole; the South Asia and the Persian Gulf routes includes 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and 
Oman; the Red Gulf and the Indian Ocean west coast routes includes Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, 
Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique.
3 The countries include Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
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Expansion area security cooperation
This area mainly includes two sub-regions in South Asia and Eastern Europe.4 After 
the Cold War, the South Asian countries gradually abandoned the idea of seeking 
security alone5 and embarked on a regional security-oriented cooperative path. 
Through friendly exchanges, the countries in the area initially formed a regional 
security environment of peace and mutual trust. The South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) proposed strengthening intraregional security 
cooperation to combat terrorism and piracy at its 17th Summit in 2011.
Security cooperation in the Eastern European region is based on the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) security system, focused on the 
relationship with Russia, without a complex network interaction model. With 
a strong security dependence on Russia, Belarus and Armenia have built an 
exclusive military-political alliance with Russia through the CSTO. But there are 
large conflicts of interests in the region, specifically between Russia and Ukraine 
and Moldova. Therefore, these countries had such a strong tendency of de-
Russianization that they did not join the collective security system, and established 
the “Guam Group”.6
Radiation zone (Europe) security cooperation
The long-standing historical interaction between European security actors and 
security threats has resulted in the formation of three major regional organizations 
for European security cooperation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
which responds to changes in the security environment in Europe, proposed 
a new strategic concept in 1991, 1999 and 2010 successively, and has played 
an important role in intervening, resolving and participating in the process of 
European security governance. The European Union (EU) has built up its security 
and defense capabilities through more than half a century of unremitting efforts, 
and is playing a growing role in resolving regional conflicts. The Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) seeks to prevent and resolve conflicts 
and to restore the damage caused by war.
4 Here Eastern Europe is the region of the former Soviet republics, including Belarus, Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova. 
5 These modes include the nonalignment mode represented by India, the alliance mode represented by Pakistan and 
the “protectorate” model represented by Nepal.
6 The “Guam Group” is an informal regional coalition formed in 1997 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. 
Uzbekistan joined in 1998 and withdrew from the organization in 2005. The organization was renamed the Community 
of Ethnic Communities at the Kiev Summit in May 2006.
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“One Road” regional security cooperation
Regional security cooperation in the Southeast Asian route 
In order to make up for the weakness of each country in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the organization tried to establish 
ASEAN-dominated security and non-traditional security cooperation. This 
cooperation came in a context of drastic change in the security situation 
in South-East Asia, the weakening of ideology, and the gradual emergence 
of specific peripheral security issues after the Cold War. The various forms of 
security mechanisms in Southeast Asia include the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF); the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asian Pacific (CSCAP) and 
others, which enhance their status and influence in regional security affairs. 
In the new century, ASEAN has actively consolidated and expanded security 
cooperation, built a security community, strengthened cooperation in cross-
border crimes such as anti-terrorism and combating drugs, and at the same 
time promoted the establishment of a mechanism for the meeting of defense 
ministers to address the shortcomings of the ARF in building a regional security 
order. In addition, it is an important feature of security cooperation in the 
region that the security cooperation mechanism dominated by Western 
powers will become the leader of regional security cooperation.
Regional security cooperation in the South Asia and Persian Gulf route
Security cooperation in the South Asian region has already been discussed, 
and will not be repeated here. The security cooperation between the 
Middle East and the Persian Gulf mainly focuses on the six countries’ 
security communities.7 The six countries of the Gulf have given priority to 
military cooperation and defense cooperation since the establishment 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). At the end of the 20th century, 
on the one hand these countries sought to form an alliance with the 
West to achieve self-protection during the Gulf crisis and war, and on 
the other hand, they continued to strengthen security cooperation 
amongst themselves to remedy their shortcomings after the war. In the 
21st century, these countries continued to increase their security identity 
and strengthened their communication and collaboration in the face of 
7 The six countries refer to the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
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the situation in Iraq, the Iranian nuclear issue and other complex areas of 
pressure. This security cooperation has been able to play a certain role in 
maintaining stability.
Regional security cooperation in the Indian Ocean West Coast routes
Security cooperation in this region focuses primarily on piracy off Africa’s 
east coast. The pirate threat extends from the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden 
to Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles, Madagascar and Mozambique. Piracy 
is especially a threat in the Gulf of Aden which is one of the busiest waters in 
the world and where at least 20,000 ships carry 12% of the world’s oil every 
year (Chalk 2010: 96). In response to the threat of piracy, the Indian Ocean 
West Coast countries and the international community have launched 
active cooperation through the formation of a multi-level anti-piracy 
system. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted resolutions 
1816, 1838, 1846, 1851 and 1897 to combat piracy. Under the authorization 
of these resolutions, the international community, including China, has 
implemented multinational naval escort missions. With the concerted 
efforts of all parties, this anti-piracy work has achieved remarkable results.
OBOR initiative of the dual security challenges
In this vast territory, the OBOR initiative not only deepens regional economic 
cooperation, but also faces a huge security risk. This paper divides that risk 
into traditional security and non-traditional security.
Traditional security challenges
Great power geopolitical games
In recent years, the world’s great powers in the area of the OBOR have put 
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Based on “The New Silk Road: Transport and Trade in Greater Central 
Asia”, edited by scholar Frederick Starr in 2007, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, in July 2011 in Chennai, India, proposed the “Greater Central 
Asia” idea and “new Silk Road” concept. Clinton (2011) advocated for 
the establishment of a link between South Asia, Central Asia and West 
Asia, and a transport and economic development network. She further 
described the “new Silk Road” program to the international community at 
the UN General Assembly meeting in September. The program proposed 
that Afghanistan's neighboring countries should make investments to 
maintain the leading position of the United States in Eurasian hinterland 
development. China’s influence has been weakened in the region, 
which has influenced economic cooperation between Central Asian 
countries and China, thus leading to the reduction of cohesion of the 
SCO. The United States has also continued to promote the “Asia-Pacific 
rebalancing” initiative by: actively creating the Indo-Pacific8 concept; 
extending the Asia-Pacific borders to the Indian subcontinent; continuously 
strengthening the Asia-Pacific military force; using the territorial disputes 
surrounding China’s maritime territories to vigorously support its allies in that 
and related disputes; and finally by implementing the offshore initiative of 
balancing China with its neighbors.
In 2009, the EU proposed the “New Silk Road Plan” to strengthen links with 
Central Asia and neighboring countries in energy, commerce, personnel 
and information, through the construction of the “Nabucca Natural Gas 
Pipeline”. The EU has actively invested to ensure its own energy supply 
security at the same time as enhancing its influence in Central Asia. In 
addition, the EU is concerned about the worsening of regional disputes 
and demands that all parties settle their disputes through dialogue and 
cooperation within a multilateral framework. The involvement of the EU, on 
the one hand, is conducive to balancing the influence of the United States 
and Russia in Central Asia. On the other hand, the situation in Central Asia 
is becoming more complicated and therefore not conducive to regional 
cooperation promoted by China’s “Silk Road Economic Belt”.
In 2002, Russia, India and Iran co-sponsored the “North-South Corridor 
Project”, proposing that Europe’s international transport corridors run 
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through India, Iran, the Caucasus and Russia, to maintain their traditional 
regional influence. In recent years, Russia has proposed the initiative of 
the integration of Central Asia, namely the “Eurasian Union” vision, aiming 
at accelerating the process of economic integration of the CIS. After 
the Cold War, Russia has always regarded Central Asia as its traditional 
sphere of influence. Despite the support of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” 
program during the Sino-Russian summit meeting in May 2014, during the 
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia 
(CICA), Russia was suspicious of China, which then influences all-round 
cooperation between China and Central Asian countries.
Japan put forward the “Eurasian diplomatic initiative” in the Cabinet of 
Ryutaro Hashimoto as early as 1997, and proposed the establishment of 
the “Central Asia + Japan” dialogue mechanism in 2004, followed by 
proposing the establishment of a “freedom and prosperity of arc” in 2006. 
Japan has enhanced its political and economic influence in this region 
by strengthening economic cooperation with the Central Asian countries 
while promoting economic development and the internationalization 
level of these countries. At the same time, Japan has made use of the 
rich oil and gas resources in the region to ensure the security of its energy 
supply. In October 2013, Abe’s cabinet intensified its concern with Asia 
and Europe, pointing out that Tokyo is the starting point for the new 
Asia-Europe Silk Road, and a geopolitical trader. Japan is also actively 
developing Pacific and Indian Ocean coastal countries to strengthen 
their military presence. These initiatives are intended to enhance a “line 
of defense” to contain China.
India, Iran and Afghanistan promote the South Asian “Southern Silk Road” 
construction project together, trying to link the “Maritime Silk Road” and 
“Land Silk Road” together. India, based on its geographical advantages, 
is seeking to dominate the Indian Ocean and has guarded against the 
existence of external forces in the Indian Ocean. In particular, the Chinese 
so-called “string pearl initiative” is viewed by India as a strategic siege. 
Raja Mohan doubts whether India will allow China’s maritime Silk Road 
to be implemented through the Indian Ocean because geopolitical and 
security factors are too strong (Mohan 2014). This has a negative impact 
on China's cooperation with countries in South Asia. In particular, India's 
strong marine initiative is bound to affect China's energy channel security. 
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In addition, India actively pursued the “Eastward” initiative, is involved in 
the South China Sea issue in economic, political and military competition 
with China, and enhanced the influence of Asia-Pacific affairs radiation, 
thus increasing China's strategic pressure in the direction of Southeast Asia.
Territorial and island disputes
For historical reasons, there are various territorial and island disputes in 
the OBOR area and the results of dispute settlement directly affect the 
security guarantee of the implementation of the initiative. The current 
disputes include:
On the ocean, disputes include: the “South China Sea dispute” between 
China and some Southeast Asian countries; “China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 981” drilling rig caused the so-called Sino-
Vietnamese “Paracel islands sovereignty” dispute in May 2014; China, 
the Philippines and Vietnam intensified the “Spratly islands sovereignty” 
dispute; there exist disputes over the Diaoyu islands and an exclusive 
economic zone in the East China Sea between China and Japan. The 
essence of these maritime disputes is the dispute between the leaders 
of regional order and their followers, and the rise of China. In the short 
term, China cannot find a solution acceptable to most of the disputing 
parties to ease the tense situation. This will not help deepen the all-round 
cooperation between China and ASEAN, thus affecting China’s overall 
right to formulate a new round of trade rules.
On land, after World War II the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, 
the Sino-Indian border dispute and the Palestinian-Israeli territorial dispute 
have still not been resolved. After the Cold War, with the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, in the “One Belt” area a number of sovereign states 
have emerged. Border demarcation between these countries has not 
been completed. Tajikistan’s enclave, Vorukh, lies in Kyrgyz territory. The 
border between the two countries is 911 kilometers long, with only 567 
kilometers delineated and more than 70 disputed areas. On 11 January 
2014, the two countries entered an armed conflict in the border area. 
Between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, twenty percent of the border is not 
defined. Between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the Fergana border is also 
not clearly defined. Kyrgyzstan has in Uzbekistan an enclave village of 
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Barak, while Uzbekistan has the enclaves of Sokh and Shakhimardan in 
Kyrgyzstan. These enclaves have clashed with local residents. In addition, 
the three countries are not compromising on the sharing of water 
resources. These border territories, enclave disputes and water disputes 
have become an important factor in the worsening situation in the region. 
The disputes in Central Asia directly negatively affect the SCO’s future 
of political mutual trust, security and economic cooperation, and is not 
conducive to maintaining the stability of the western region of China.
Regional political turmoil in individual countries
Most of the countries in the OBOR area are developing countries which 
are affected by complicated factors such as social class contradictions 
and ethnic and religious problems. These countries generally practice 
party politics. However, due to the struggle for government, the political 
situation in some countries is vulnerable and uncertain. Integration of 
national interests and recognition of a common sense of belonging is 
more difficult, which leads to continuous lack of formulating important 
internal and foreign policy. For example, political developments in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been through ups and downs. In particular, 
Kyrgyzstan’s North-South contradictions are still sharp and seasonal protests 
are becoming normalized. Kyrgyzstan announced that it will actively 
participate in the construction of the “One Belt”, while in December 2013 
it announced its withdrawal from the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-
Uzbekistan Railway, which increases the difficulty of project coordination. In 
addition, Somalia along the Indian Ocean, Yemen, Iran, and Pakistan are 
increasingly becoming potentially dangerous countries or regions. As the 
OBOR initiative to promote China’s future is bound to increase investment 
in the region, increase imports, frequent personnel exchanges, these 
countries will increase the economic cost of investment and reduce co-
operation efficiency, and thus affect China’s overseas interests.
Non-traditional security challenges
The terrorism threat
The destructive activities of the “three forces” (terrorist forces, religious 
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extremists, and national separatist forces), which are the core of terrorism, 
are an important factor threatening the implementation of the OBOR 
initiative, increasingly becoming the largest non-traditional security threat 
in the region. Despite the differences between extremist organizations’ 
political aims, organizational forms, personnel composition and activities, 
their common feature is that they oppose secular regimes and advocate 
the establishment of an Islamic state with political and religious unity. As a 
result of changes in the international anti-terrorism situation, and changes 
in the regional security situation, extremist organizations in the region 
are characterized by a cross-cutting of personnel, guiding ideology, 
decentralization, fragmentation, and other links with international terrorist 
organizations. The United States withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in 
2014 is likely to lead to an escalation of the conflict within that territory, 
resulting in Islamic extremism and terrorism which may “overflow”, 
affecting regional stability. In addition, in recent years East Turkistan 
Islamic Movement (ETIM) terrorist forces, linked to each other at home and 
abroad against Chinese targets, from time to time to carry out attacks 
which are a threat to Chinese people’s personal and property safety.
Sea channel safety
Maintaining secure access is an important consideration in the 
implementation of the OBOR initiative, which will make sure the sea 
channel stays open rather than cut off. Ninety percent of global 
commercial trade and sixty-five percent of the world’s total oil volume 
go through ocean shipping, with the Indian Ocean providing half of the 
world’s container shipments and seventy percent of the transportation of 
petroleum products from the Middle East to the Pacific. The Indian Ocean 
routes are strategically important for global trade such as the Strait of 
Mendoza, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca, with forty 
percent of the world’s trade flowing through the Strait of Malacca and 
forty percent of crude oil trade flowing through Hormuz Strait（Kaplan 
2009: 19-20). Most of China's ocean-going oil trade is concentrated in the 
Straits of Malacca, the Indian Ocean to the Middle East and North Africa. 
If oil is the blood of the industry, then the channel connecting the Indian 
Ocean from the Middle East, and through the Malacca Straits channel, 
has actually become the lifeline of China's economic growth. Therefore, 
it is very important to maintain the secure passage of the Malacca Strait, 
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the Strait of Hormuz and the Mande Strait on the “One Road”. Regarding 
the Malacca Strait, the challenge mainly comes from the United States, 
which also tries to control the Strait. The Strait of Hormuz is beset by a 
deteriorating security situation within the region, while the Mande Strait is 
challenged mainly from the pirate threat. According to the Global Piracy 
Report of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), in 2013 piracy off the 
coast of Somalia declined significantly; it has fallen from 237 events in 
2011 to 15 in 2013 (ICC 2014). However, the threat of attacks still exists, 
especially off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden.
Regional economic integration pressure
The purpose of China’s OBOR initiative is to establish closer economic 
and trade ties with Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and 
Europe, to further develop mutual cooperation and a broader space 
for development, to promote regional development and prosperity 
through technology and investment, and to promote China’s economic 
upgrading and rebalancing. The United States has proposed to construct 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TTP) to hinder the process of 
regional integration in East Asia and to divide the ASEAN-led Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which has gradually formed 
in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, Europe and the United States 
work hard to build the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
agreement (TTIP), advocate more liberal international economic and 
trade rules, and hinder the process of economic and trade cooperation 
between Asia and Europe. TTP and TTIP build on the interests of the West’s 
own network, thus blocking the strategic objectives of OBOR.
Transnational organized crime
China has been promoting economic and trade relations among countries 
in the OBOR initiative. At the same time, transnational organized crime, one 
of the “three major world catastrophes” according to the United Nations 
General Assembly, has become increasingly rampant and has seriously 
affected the economic development and social stability of all countries 
involved. Current types of transnational organized crime include: a) drug 
smuggling, specifically the spread of opium production in Afghanistan to 
the world. The “drug economy” and religious extremism in Central Asia 
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combined, impact on China’s western security; b) illegal immigrant crime, 
China’s labor export and overseas employment at the same time, resulting 
in a variety of crime with foreign labor service; c) transnational economic 
crime, such as money laundering and telecommunications fraud.
China’s choices regarding OBOR security issues 
Through the implementation of the OBOR initiative, China can form a new 
pattern of opening up in all directions along its coast, inland and border 
areas. Such openings will also raise the level of economic development 
and economic share in China’s western inland areas. It will ensure the 
safety of maritime transport and strengthen political mutual trust. In 
the future, in order to achieve “policy communication, transportation 
connection, trade facilitation, currency circulation, [and] community 
consensus”, China must manage its security risks, China not only needs to 
strengthen its own power, but also needs to build on and pay attention to 
three points: 1) provision of safe public goods; 2) managing the interests 
of great powers; 3) Recognizing Pakistan’s ‘pivot’ role.
Cooperation to achieve the provision of safe public goods
Traditional and non-traditional security in the OBOR region is intertwined, 
involving a large number of sovereign state disputes which no country can face 
and resolve on its own. Therefore, China need only to establish a more open and 
cooperative concept in order to mobilize the region to actively participate in 
the implementation of OBOR, and ultimately achieve a mutual beneficial and 
win-win situation. In fact, China’s presence in the region has been to uphold 
security cooperation. As of August 2016, China has sent 24 fleet escort missions, 
and carried out security escorts for more than 6,000 Chinese and foreign ships. 
Moreover, it has successfully assisted and rescued more than 60 Chinese and 
foreign ships. Ahudul Sahibi, former mayor of Kabul, Afghanistan, argues that 
China attaches great importance to the development of the Silk Road with 
regard to energy efficiency and safety, having initiated the Silk Road Initiative 
in 2000 and reintroduced a multilateral initiative in Central Asia.
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In the future, China not only needs to put forward the concept of security, 
but also needs to further implement specific practices. This paper argues 
that China needs to understand the needs of the countries in the region 
and actively provide public goods for regional security governance. 
Despite China’s limited defense capacity in the traditional security 
field, China’s current maritime military power is nothing more than a 
“counter-interference” (Rourke 2012) force vis-a-vis the United States. But 
China’s advantages in non-traditional security areas will be obvious. In 
addition to its increasing economic strength, China can advocate for the 
establishment of a variety of regional security funds for national security 
cooperation, based on the principle of economic profit-making, so as to 
ensure economic security and achieve the desire of a “community of 
common destiny”. Once the idea of public goods is put forward, measures 
and plans should be follow in a timely manner, and the implementation 
requires consideration and dedication. On many occasions, China has 
repeatedly proposed to promote the South China Sea maritime security 
order and ecological protection action, and has set up a 3 billion RMB 
yuan “China - ASEAN Marine Cooperation Fund” in 2011, but ASEAN is still 
not clear how to apply and use these funds.
Being sensitive to the interests of countries in the region, especially the 
interests of great powers
The OBOR initiative is mainly facing security issues related to domestic factors 
specific to particular countries, and territory and island disputes more based 
on historical reasons. In this regard, China should pay attention to the interests 
of the region’s countries. Specifically regarding China’s territorial and island 
disputes, the country should continue to adhere to the “sovereign to me, 
shelving differences and seeking joint development” principle, to take into 
account the economic interests of the other parties to the disputes and 
actively resolving it through bilateral consultations. China should adhere to 
the principle of “non-interference in internal affairs”, play a constructive role in 
bringing relevant parties together, and resolve and maintain regional stability 
peacefully when facing the political turmoil in the countries concerned.
In addition, regional security issues introduce the great power factor. Great 
power competition in the OBOR region will follow a normal trend, the essence 
of which is the shift between emerging powers and conservative powers. 
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Therefore, China should address the security risks in the region while bringing 
in great powers as “stakeholders”, to strengthen cooperation with each 
other and properly coordinate relations. The United States and Russia play 
an essential role here. As a hegemonic country, the US has a wide range of 
interests in the region, while Russia, as a regional, traditional country, still has a 
certain influence on the various security issues in the region. 
At present, China, the US, and Russia can make full use of existing bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation mechanisms, adopt flexible and diverse forms 
of cooperation, promote cooperation at different levels, strengthen political 
trust and seek points of common interest. Russia is closer to China than to the 
US, sharing with China the common mission of national rejuvenation. China 
and the “Eurasian Union” need a certain degree of “docking” to jointly 
safeguard the “Silk Road Economic belt” in the field of security. At present, 
there is a structural “security dilemma” between China and the United States 
in the traditional security field. China’s development is “zero-sum” next to US 
global hegemony. Sino-Russian coordination can easily be regarded as a 
mechanism to “exclude the US”. Moreover, there is a strong factor for the 
United States to become involved in territorial and islands disputes: avoiding 
political unrest in the region. Therefore, Sino-US security cooperation should 
be more related to anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, cracking down on transnational 
organized crime and other non-traditional areas. Gradually, as confidence is 
built, the two countries can deal with common challenges through a variety 
of existing dialogue and communication mechanisms.
Recognizing Pakistan’s “pivot” role
In geographical distribution, the OBOR initiative of security assurance in the south 
and north depends on the effective interaction between “One Belt” and “One 
Road”. Although the strategic concept of the Bangladesh-China-India-Burma 
(BCIM) Economic Corridor and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) can 
link “One Belt” and “One Road”, the “two corridors” are too broadly connected 
to each other. Facing security challenges here is not obvious, but the real 
effective interaction lies in playing the role of a “pivot” state. The “One Belt” and 
“One Road” have common areas, mainly including India and Pakistan in South 
Asia. China and India have long-standing disputes over territory, so China must 
pay attention to Pakistan’s “pivot” role. To this end, China-Pakistan all-weather 
strategic cooperative partnership can ensure that this role can be played.
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In the “One Belt”, China can use Pakistan’s influence on Afghanistan and 
its own geopolitical conditions, including ETIM forces in the Central Asian 
region and various terrorist organizations, to ensure the safety of western 
China. China can use the traditional relationship between the United 
States and Pakistan to “bridge” and strengthen security cooperation 
between China and the United States. China can use the belligerence 
between India and Pakistan to contain India and to reduce its security 
pressure from the southwest direction. In the “One Road”, China is not 
a coastal state of the Indian Ocean and also subject to the naval force 
constraints. China can use the media to participate in Indian Ocean 
affairs in Pakistan, to ensure the safety of sea lanes. Although China has 
repeatedly stressed that it will not set up military bases overseas, this does 
not affect China’s rational use of the Gwadar port in Pakistan. Its location 
is important for the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean west coast 
ensuring energy security in the Gulf region.
Conclusion
The OBOR initiative requires that China should work together to strengthen 
balanced development of a comprehensively open economy, involving 
both land and sea. However, in implementation, “One Belt” seems to 
take priority, and the Chinese government promotes high-speed rail 
and other equipment manufacturing “going out” as an opportunity to 
actively promote land-based transport infrastructure construction, which 
is quicker than transporting goods over sea. But I believe that we need 
to give priority to the use of marine resources in the future. Several cities 
in China opened the China Railway Express, but the traditional maritime 
transport trade will remain in a dominant position for a very long period 
of time. The time advantage of land transportation is also affected by 
various security risks - the security challenges facing the OBOR initiative 
mentioned above - wherein land security challenges account for the vast 
majority of security risks. Through the international community’s efforts 
in recent years to combat piracy, control the ocean and resolve island 
disputes, the risk to sea-lanes has been greatly reduced.
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In the future, China will work with all the countries in the region to 
actively respond to various security risks and challenges, and successfully 
implement the OBOR initiative. Eventually, China and other countries will 
become a “community of destiny” and a “community of interests”, which 
will help safeguard China’s national interests, including security, build a 
responsible image of China, enhance China’s soft power, and create a 
favorable international environment for China’s modernization drive.
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